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Abstract
The purpose of the work is to develop a prototype model that can be used to
illustrate a model-based support for the analysis of decisions about ex-ante finan-
cial instruments for coping with consequences of natural catastrophes in developing
countries. The prototype model is based on a model presented by P.K. Freeman
and G.Ch.Pflug, but it has been adapted to the situation in Poland and modified
to permit the analysis of various instruments for risk transfer. The proposed model
considers a portfolio of assets (such as infrastructure, private property, etc.) that
generates deterministic returns, but it is affected by damages caused by floods.
A stochastic model of damages caused by floods has been formulated in order to
allow the comparison of risk transfer instruments (such as catastrophe bonds and
insurance) for various layers of the portfolio values.
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Analysis of applications of some ex-ante
instruments for the transfer of catastrophic risks.
Piotr Nowak* (pnowak@ibspan.waw.pl)
1 Introduction
Natural disasters are a significant problem for developed and developing countries.
Lately, they have occurred with an increasing frequency and severity. Floods, wind-
storms, earthquakes and other catastrophes have significantly damaged governmen-
tal and private property. In past ten years, three U.S. hurricanes, Andrew (1992),
Hugo (1989) and Opal (1995), caused total direct damages of $40 billion. In the
decade 1988 - 97, 65% of all flood losses occurred in Asia ([Munich Re. 1998a] and
[Munich Re. 1998b]). Property damage from the Polish flood in 1997 amounted to
about $3 billion.
Recently, substantial progress has been made in understanding the nature and
consequences of natural hazard damages. Catastrophes are events of low probability
and high impact. In developed countries, reconstruction following natural disasters
is financed by risk transfer. Such a transfer can be made by purchasing policies by
insurance companies or by issuing so-called ”catastrophe bonds”. These financial
instruments are ex-ante risk financing instruments because they are arranged before
a catastrophe takes place.
This article aims at discussing the advantages and disadvantages of ex-ante risk
transfer instruments in Poland, either using catastrophe bonds and/or insurance. A
model has been developed to analyze trade-offs between costs of risk transfer and
the provided financial protection. The model also permits analysis of the costs and
benefits of risk transfer for different layers of risk. This analysis is based on Monte
- Carlo simulation.
The starting point for our considerations was the article Infrastructure in
Developing Countries : Risk and Protection written by Paul K.Freeman and
Georg Ch.Pflug [Freeman, Pflug 1999]. The model has been adapted to the Polish
situation. The Freeman and Pflug model assumes damage is solely to government
property and reconstruction is financed by government. Neither assumption applies
to Poland. We consider the situation where different layers of risk may be transferred
using different instruments. As the result of statistical analysis, sizes of damages are
random variables with different probability distribution in each layer. The spatial
correlations between the damaged assets were not considered.
*Systems Research Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Newelska 6, 01-447 Warszawa,
Poland.
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The first section is devoted to a short discussion about catastrophe bonds, which
are relatively new financial instruments. In the second section, a stochastic model
of damages caused by floods has been formulated to allow the comparison of risk
transfer instruments for various layers of the portfolio values. The implementation
through Monte - Carlo methods is shown in the next two sections. The fifth section
contains the conclusions.
2 Catastrophe Bonds
Catastrophe bonds are relatively new financial instruments. They are issued as
means of risk transfer to private investors and are connected with a precisely de-
scribed catastrophe event (the so-called triggering event).
The basic difference between them and other kinds of bonds is the fact that they
are more risky for bondholders. It is so, because part of their principal values and
sometimes whole ”principals” are not repaid if event takes place that is acknowledged
as triggering occur. For some cases of bonds the bondholders may also not receive
interests. As we mentioned before, catastrophe events occur with low probability,
but if they take place, losses of bondholders are relatively high. The amount of
money obtained from investors and placed in an escrow account is then transferred
to the insured by the escrow agent.
The first ”cat bond” was a USD$50 million bond issues in 1990 (see [Zhang,
Zakharia 1998]). The principal of the bond was payable to the issuing insurance
company in the event of Richter scale 7 or greater earthquake in specified region of
Japan. The best known bonds were the USAA (the fourth-largest U.S. home-owner
insurer in 1996) ”Act of God” bonds sold by Merrill Lynch & Co. The triggering
event was a hurricane which cost USAA over $1 billion. The probability of the
event was 1% and investors received interest based on one-month LIBOR (London
Interbank Offering Rate) plus 3 points. In 1997 USAA issued almost $500 million
in catastrophe bonds with a triggering event being a category three, four or five
hurricane hitting one of twenty U.S. states or the District of Columbia and causing
more than $1 billion of claims against USAA.
In the beginning the investors demand for cat-bonds was small, but has increased
every year. The California Earthquake Authority was created to provide earthquake
insurance (see [Stripple 1998]). It is a privately financed and publicly managed state
agency. A $1 billion earthquake catastrophe bond issued by CEA in 1996 was the
first governmental instrument of this type.
Why have catastrophe bonds developed? First, they may be cheaper than the
traditional insurance or reinsurance. Second, since the face amount of the bonds is
placed in an escrow account, there is no risk of delayed payoffs for the insured. Third,
they can be accessible for countries with a significant catastrophe risk and limited
domestic insurance markets (see [Freeman 1998]). Additionally, they are means of
risk transfer for losses which are not otherwise insurable, since insurance companies
do not insure a property or they limit insurance in some regions of high catastrophe
risk. Finally, if the ”cat bonds” are issued by government or local authorities, they
reduce uncertainty to the public budget and of course, when the catastrophe occurs
they cover potential losses.
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Since catastrophe bonds are risky, they should give investors higher returns than
”riskless bonds”, such as treasury bonds. But this is not the only reason for purchas-
ing them. They enable portfolio diversification, because they are not correlated with
other financial instruments in the stock market. The market value of ”cat bonds”
is a very interesting and complicated theme. One of the methods of calculating it
is the so called arbitrage pricing, i.e. calculation of the present market value under
the assumption of no return without risk. Actually, financial mathematicians deal
with this problem.
3 The Assumptions and Basic Formulations of the
Model
3.1 Notations
n > 0 - number of layers of losses (for which different financial or insurance instru-
ments may be applied).
i - index of a layer, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
li−1 and li are lower and upper limit of i - th layer, l0 = 0, ln = 1.
γi - price coefficient for the best available risk transfer instrument in i - th layer.
u = (u1, u2, ..., un) - vector index of binary variables describing risk transfer in
each layer (ui = 1 denotes transferring risk in i-th layer and ui = 0 - not
transferring risk); u = 0 = (0, 0, .., 0) denotes the case of no risk transfer.
t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T - sequence of time period.
Ju (t), Ju1 (t) and J
u
2 (t) denote the values of fixed property, its authorities’ part
1
and its private part respectively, at the beginning of year t, for a given strategy
of risk transfer (defined by u).
Iu (t), Iu1 (t) and I
u
2 (t) - corresponding values at the end of year t.
d ∈ (0, 1) - depreciation of property.
r > 0 - yearly private property growth constant.
θ ∈ [0, 1] - fraction of protected private property.
pu (t) - price of the risk transfer.
δ (t) - fraction of destroyed property in the year t.
w (t) - fraction of net return invested in authorities’ property in the year t.
INV u (t) - value of authorities investment.
1Further on by an authority we understand either central or local government that takes a
responsibility for properties for which risk transfer instruments will be considered.
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v ∈ [0, 1] - return constant.
Ru (t) - the yearly authorities return from property.
Ou (t) - outpayments to be made in year t.
Nu (t) - yearly net return from the property.
N u (t) - cumulated net return from the property.
In the next subsection we will use the following auxiliary variables:
Jup (t) = J
u
1 (t) + θJ
u
2 (t).
Iup (t) = I
u
1 (t) + θI
u
2 (t).
We will also use the following notation for a given function f
f+ (x) =
{
f (x) if f (x) > 0
0 if f (x) ≤ 0
.
3.2 Model Assumptions
• The value Iu (t) is given by the formulae
Iu (t) = Iu
1
(t) + Iu
2
(t) , Iu
1
(0) = I1, I
u
2
(0) = I2,
where I1 and I2 are fixed values.
• The value of private part grows according to the following formula:
Ju
2
(t) = (1− d) Iu
2
(t− 1) + r (t)
for a given sequence of increments: {r (t)}T
t=1
.
• The authorities protect their part Ju1 (t) and take in responsibility a part θJ
u
2 (t)
of the private property. They transfer risk for this part or cover damages if
the flood occurs (in the case u = 0 authorities cover the whole damaged part
of θJu2 (t)).
• The authorities invest an amount INV u (t). This amount is given by a se-
quence {w (t)}Tt=1 of fractions of the previous net return from the authorities
property Nu (t− 1) (calculated according to the formula (1), pg.5), if it was
positive.
INV u (t) = w (t)Nu+ (t− 1) .
• The dependence of Jk
1
(t) , and Jkp (t) from the values of the corresponding
properties in the end of the previous year is given by formulas:
Ju1 (t) = (1− d) I
u
1 (t− 1) + INV
u (t) ,
Jup (t) = (1− d) I
u
p (t− 1) + INV
u (t) + θr.
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• The losses in the i - th layer are defined by a random variableXi. Distributions
of Xi may be different for different i. Layer of losses in each year changes
according to the Markov chain described in the next subsection. A random
event connected with the i-th. layer destroys the property in lower layers and
the fraction δ (t)− li−1 of property in this layer.
• The price pu (t) of the risk transfer is calculated by the formula
pu (t) = Jup (t)
n∑
i=1
uiγi (li − li−1) .
• In the end of year t we have the following equations for the values of authorities
and private property:
Iu1 (t) = J
u
1 (t) {1− δ (t) +
n∑
i=1
ui[min(li, δ (t))−min(li−1, δ (t))]},
Iu2 (t) = J
u
2 (t) [1− δ (t) + θδ (t)].
• The yearly authorities’ return Ru (t) from property Iu
1
(t) is calculated accord-
ing to the formula
Ru (t) = vIu1 (t) .
• The outpayments to be made in year t are
Ou (t) = INV u (t) + pu (t) +
+θJu2 (t)
n∑
i=1
(1− ui) [min(li, δ (t))−min(li−1, δ (t))] .
• The net return from the authorities’ property is
Nu (t) = Ru (t)−Ou (t) . (1)
• Cumulated net return from authorities property is calculated by using of for-
mula: N u (t) =
∑t
s=1
Nu (s). This is a measure of wealth of the country
because ∆GDP (s) is an increasing function of Nu (s) .
3.3 The Occurrence of the Flood
The occurrence of the flood is described by the homogenous Markov chain ξ (t) with
the discrete time t = 0, 1, 2, ... satisfying the following properties:
1. The space of its states is the set {1, 2, ..., n} .
2. There are p1, p2, ..., pn belonging to the interval [0, 1] being the initial distri-
butions, i.e.
P (ξ (0) = i) = pi, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
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3. There is a parameter ρ belonging to the interval [0, 1] such that the transition
matrix is of the form:
(1− ρ)


p1 p2 ... pn
p1 p2 ... pn
... ... ... ...
p1 p2 ... pn

+ ρ


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
... ... ... ...
0 0 0 1


ξ (t) takes the value i when flood damages in the year t occur in the layer i.
The parameters pi = P (ξ = i) are ergodic probabilities of the occurrence of
the flood with damages in the i-th. layer and ρ is the correlation between the
random variables ξ (t) and ξ (t+ 1).
The probability distribution of the relative size of damages depends on the state
and the random variable describing it is denoted byXi (t) . In this case δ (t) = Xi (t),
t = 1, 2, ...
3.4 Price Coefficients for the Risk Transfer Instruments
For each layer considered in the model the available instruments of risk transfer
are evaluated ”off line” (i.e. a separate study for each instrument has to be done)
and the corresponding prices are determined. For each layer the instrument with
the cheapest price coefficient (denoted by γl) is selected and used for the approach
described in this paper.2 In the model we will estimate coefficients γl from above
by the values of corresponding insurance coefficients.
It is generally known (see [Freeman, Pflug 1999]) that if the random variable X
describes percentage values of losses of a given property then its insurance price is
given by the formula:
γ = (1 + β)EX,
where EX is the expected value of X and β is a risk premium.
Applying this formula we will name the right - hand side quantity by the price
coefficient for the best available risk transfer instrument.
4 Monte - Carlo Simulations
4.1 Assumptions and Parameters Settings
To illustrate the model by using the Monte - Carlo simulations we set its parameters.
The number of states n = 4. The meaning of them is:
- the first - flood with an occurrence more frequent than 20 years (p1 = 0.95);
- the second - flood with an occurrence between 20 and 50 years (p2 = 0.03);
2Pricing of financial instruments is a complex issue and therefore it is far beyond the scope of
this paper. The related problems are discussed for example in [Maksymiuk, Gatarek 1999].
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- the third - flood with an occurrence between 50 and 100 years (p3 = 0.01);
- the fourth - flood with an occurrence rarer than 100 years (p4 = 0.01).
With every state we linked the risk premiums: 1.0, 0.21, 0.15, 0.09
and limits of relative sizes of losses:
l0 = 0, l1 = 0.1, l2 = 0.3, l3 = 0.5, l4 = 1.
The random variables describing the relative (i.e. percentage) size of damages if a
flooding event in a given state would occur, have the following distributions:
X1 s (l1 − l0)β1(1, 99),
X2 s l1 + (l2 − l1)β2(2, 4),
X3 s l2 + (l3 − l2)β3(2, 4)
and
X4 s l3 + (l4 − l3) β4(2, 4),
where β1, β2, β3 and β4 are independent, β(1, 99) and β(2, 4) distributed random
variables, respectively. Fig. 1. depicts probability density functions of variables
X1, X2, X3 and X4.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Distributions of losses in each state of Markov chain, n = 4.
beta(1,99)       
0.1+0.2*beta(2,4)
0.3+0.2*beta(2,4)
0.5+0.5*beta(2,4)
1. Densities of flood losses.3
3Due to the technical limitations figures in the printed version of this paper are grayscaled.
However, the electronic versions of this paper (available from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/docs/
Admin/PUB/Catalog/) contain color figures that are much easier to interpret.
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Parameters setting for X1 corresponds to the situation of very frequent floods with
not significant losses. It may be replaced by δ{1} distribution which corresponds to
no losses case in the first state of Markov chain. The rest of the parameters settings
is presented in the following table:
d 0.033
r, θ, w 0.1
ρ 0.05
v 0.15
I1, I2 100.0
ϕ1 (x) v ∗ x
ϕ2 (x) R = 20 ∗ erf(
x−90
50
)) + 12
where ϕ1 and ϕ2 are two cases of phi function having the the following graphs:
−150 −100 −50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Phi functions.
phi1(x)
phi2(x)
2. Phi functions.
Choice of the phi function depends on region considered in the model.
4.2 Simulations Results
Figure 3 depicts 10 scenarios obtained from the Monte Carlo simulations made with
the parameters from previous subsection. Each bend of a scenario denotes flooding
event with big losses. Observing the behavior of scenarios it is easy to notice that if
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a sever catastrophe occurs at the beginning, it is very difficult to obtain substantial
cumulated net return at the end of the time period.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
NN
years
All scenarios ( fig.0000a4 ns = 10 ).
3. Illustration of ten scenarios. NN denotes cumulated net return N .
The next two figures shows 500 scenarios in two cases: no risk transfer and the
risk transfer in three first layers of losses.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
N
N
years
All scenarios ( fig.0000a3 ns = 500 ).
4. No risk transfer.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
N
N
years
All scenarios ( fig.1110a3 ns = 500 ).
5. Risk transfer in first three layers.
We see that much more scenarios is focused in the upper part of figure in the second
case.
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A good characteristic of obtained results are the so-called boxplots with whiskers
which depict typical variability intervals for medians of net returns in the year 30
for functions ϕ1 and ϕ2 generating return from property:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Box and whisker plot for cumulated net returns in 30 th yea r ( fig. boxpl1 ns = 10000 ).
V
a
lu
e
s
Column Number
6. Box&Whiskers Plots (for ϕ1(I)).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
50
100
150
200
250
300
Box and whisker plot for cumulated net returns in 30 th yea r ( fig. boxpl3 ns = 10000 ).
V
a
lu
e
s
Column Number
7. Box&Whiskers Plots (for ϕ2(I)).
The upper side of rectangle is value of upper (third) quartile, the lower one of lower
(first) quartile and the red segment inside rectangle denotes the median. Whiskers
are essential maximum and minimum. Red pluses are the values below or above
minimum or maximum, respectively, which differ very much from median. The
meaning of Column Numbers is described by the following table:
Column Number Value of u Column Number Value of u
1 (0, 0, 0, 0) 9 (0, 0, 0, 1)
2 (1, 0, 0, 0) 10 (1, 0, 0, 1)
3 (0, 1, 0, 0) 11 (0, 1, 0, 1)
4 (1, 1, 0, 0) 12 (1, 1, 0, 1)
5 (0, 0, 1, 0) 13 (0, 0, 1, 1)
6 (1, 0, 1, 0) 14 (1, 0, 1, 1)
7 (0, 1, 1, 0) 15 (0, 1, 1, 1)
8 (1, 1, 1, 0) 16 (1, 1, 1, 1)
The smaller dispersion the better results. The best situation is in the case of full
risk transfer (16), good in the case of risk transfer in three layers (8, 12 and 14),
the worst in the case of no transfer of risk (1). The second observation is that
risk transfer in the first layer diminishes dispersion. However the payments for the
risk transfer decreases cumulated net returns. To the end of this subsection we will
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analyze results only for ϕ = ϕ2 because there is not a big difference between them
and results obtained for ϕ = ϕ1. (It is easy to notice this fact for two previous
figures).
The next four figures shows quantile curves for cumulated net return from property
in the whole time period.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
NN
years
Quantiles and the mean value ( fig.0000qm3 ns = 10000 ).
minimum     
5% quantile 
25% quantile
median      
75% quantile
95% quantile
maximum     
mean value  
8. Quantiles for u = (0, 0, 0, 0).
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
NN
years
Quantiles and the mean value ( fig.0110qm3 ns = 10000 ).
minimum     
5% quantile 
25% quantile
median      
75% quantile
95% quantile
maximum     
mean value  
9. Quantiles for u = (0, 1, 1, 0).
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
NN
years
Quantiles and the mean value ( fig.1110qm3 ns = 10000 ).
minimum     
5% quantile 
25% quantile
median      
75% quantile
95% quantile
maximum     
mean value  
10. Quantiles for u = (1, 1, 1, 0).
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
NN
years
Quantiles and the mean value ( fig.1111qm3 ns = 10000 ).
minimum     
5% quantile 
25% quantile
median      
75% quantile
95% quantile
maximum     
mean value  
11. Quantiles for u = (1, 1, 1, 1).
Let us pay attention at the fact that the border line of 5% lower quantile goes up
when the number of layers with transferred risk growths.
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Observations made to this time are confirmed by analysis of standard deviations
apearing in the following table:
Column Number σ Column Number σ
1 61.50 9 53.32
2 48.56 10 40.67
3 42.54 11 32.20
4 32.16 12 18.78
5 49.96 13 42.25
6 35.79 14 26.32
7 29.03 15 19.94
8 16.27 16 0.74
5 Discussion of Results
As the results of the considerations one can formulate the following conclusions:
• Risk transfer across more layers causes smaller dispersion of results. The
greatest dispersion is linked to the situation of no risk transfer. The almost
zeros dispersion takes place in the situation of full risk transfer in all layers (it
is zero for θ = 0).
• Layers with the greatest probability of occurrence have especially important
role in this dispersion reduction.
• The risk transfer payments cause small decrease of maximum, mean value,
median and upper quantiles in the situation of risk transfer.
• Right parameters setting of the ϕ function (which may be different for different
regions) is also very important for this model. As an illustration we will show
Fig.12. (for ϕ (x) = ϕ2 (x)) and Fig.13. (for ϕ (x) = ϕ3 (x) = 40 · erf(
x−40
100
))
describing results of Monte - Carlo simulations for each u in the form of pairs:
lower 5% quantile and maximum curves.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Q5max3   ns = 10000.
0000
1000
0100
1100
0010
1010
0110
1110
0001
1001
0101
1101
0011
1011
0111
1111
12. 5%quantile - max, ϕ = ϕ2.
– 14 –
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
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300
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Q5max1   ns = 10000.
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1100
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1101
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1111
13. 5%quantile - max, ϕ = ϕ3.
• It is highly likely that for some regions and corresponding to them parameters,
risk transfer in the first layer may be not profitable.
5.1 The Influence of the Application of Financial Instru-
ments on GDP
It is also possible to consider the influence of the ex-ante instruments upon GDP.
The main difference of such a model from the previous one may be formulated as
follows.
The dependence between GDP and the value of infrastructure is given by an in-
creasing function ψ : R+→ R+. We have the equalities:
GDP k (t) = ψ
(
Ik (t)
)
,
GDP k (0) = G0.
The main trouble with the application of this model is the fact that economists have
no good mathematical models which describe the dependence between the change
of infrastracture value caused by a catastrophe and the corresponding decrease of
GDP. Currently, IIASA has a research project in partnership with The World Bank
focusing on these issues. However, the description of this new research is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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